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I. INTRODUCTION
Financial crises take many forms. Real estate crises can
devastate economies.' So too can bank crises.2  Stock market
crashes can precipitate crises of their own.3 The "subprime crisis"
represents the confluence and worst of all three; like three
cyclones merging together in warm offshore waters, these three
kinds of crises generated even more destructive force when
conjoined. The panic that took shape in U.S. real estate and
capital markets in 2007 represents another example in a long
historical line of intertwined banking and real estate crises.
4
Securitization served as a new coupling rod joining cycles in real
estate and banking markets and creating a new pathway for
contagion.
Scholars have scrutinized many aspects of the subprime crisis,
including the proliferation of exotic mortgages and the failure of
mortgage-backed securities markets.5 Yet the role that bank
regulation played in enabling and stoking bank investments in
1 See, e.g., John M. Quigley, Real Estate and the Asian Crisis, 10 J. HOUSING ECON. 129,
130 (2001) (arguing that real estate markets contributed significantly to the 1997 crises in
Asian economies). Dwight M. Jaffee, The Swedish Real Estate Crisis (Oct. 1994) (unpublished
manuscript), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/Papers/Sweden.pdf (examining the causes
of the 1990 real estate crisis in Sweden).
2 See, e.g., Asli Demirgii-Kunt et al., Inside the Crisis: An Empirical Analysis of
Banking Systems in Distress 6-10 (World Bank Policy Research, Paper No. 2431, 2000),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=237651 (reporting the effects of bank crises). See
generally BANKING CRISES: CASES AND ISSUES (Vasudevan Sundararajan & J.T. Tomds
Baliflo eds., 1991) (describing what happens to a banking system after a crisis).
3 See generally DIDIER SORNETTE, WHY STOCK MARKETS CRASH: CRITICAL EVENTS IN
COMPLEX FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (2003) (providing insight into bank, real estate, and stock
market crises). For an earlier article discussing common factors among different types of
crises, and suggesting legal solutions to financial problems, see generally Frank Partnoy,
Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741 (2000).
4 See Richard Herring & Susan Wachter, Bubbles in Real Estate Markets, in ASSET
PRICE BUBBLES: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY, REGULATORY, AND INTERNATIONAL
POLICIES 217, 217-27 (William C. Hunter et al. eds., 2003) ("[D]evelop[ing] an explanation
of how real estate bubbles and banking crises may be related."). For other empirical and
theoretical studies of the correlation and causal links between real estate and banking
crises, see infra Part V.
5 See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 17-19, 33-35 (2011) (noting the
contributions of securitization and non-traditional mortgages to the financial crisis).
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mortgage-backed securities, and thus creating the transmission
line between bank and real estate crises, remains under-explored.
6
Indeed, a series of incremental legislative and regulatory changes,
which accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, facilitated bank
participation in the markets for mortgage-backed securities, as
well as in asset-backed securities more generally.7  Certain
changes facilitated bank investments in mortgage-backed
securities.8 Other shifts in legal rules enabled and encouraged
banks to securitize mortgage assets on their balance sheets and
deal in the resulting securities.9
These changes significantly enlarged the exceptions to U.S.
legal restrictions on bank investments both in real estate and
securities. Curiously, many of these changes did not generate
much debate, nor did they receive sufficient scholarly attention.
Part of this neglect may be explained by the fact that
securitization offered to address three of the historical concerns
underlying bank restrictions on real estate investments: the credit,
liquidity, and interest rate risk associated with real property
investments.10  The legal changes rested on a series of
assumptions regarding the ability of securitization to mitigate the
risks to banks inherent in mortgage lending and real estate
investment-whether those banks securitized mortgages they
originated or purchased mortgage-backed securities." These
assumptions proved ill-founded, as highly correlated losses on
exotic mortgages during the crisis vaporized the value and
6 My focus in this Article is on regulations and laws affecting entities chartered as
banks, even though savings and loans were also major sources of residential real estate
lending for several decades following the Second World War. Richard K. Green & Susan M.
Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 93, 97 (2005). These institutions faced the same credit, liquidity, and interest rate
risks from residential real estate lending as do banks.
7 See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Part III.B.
10 See infra Part II (explaining the risks faced by banks from real estate transactions and
how securitization created attractive responses to those risks).
11 See infra Part IV (noting the premises of these legal changes, which rested on
assumptions regarding securitization of real estate instruments).
[Vol. 50:89
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liquidity of mortgage-backed securities.12 These correlated losses
triggered a solvency and liquidity crisis for those banks that
invested in these instruments.
13
Changes in bank regulation not only permitted banks to take on
these risks and fueled the growth of mortgage-backed securities;
they also helped create a national market for real estate
mortgages.14  By fostering the growth of securitization and
permitting massive financial industry consolidation, banking law
contributed to the development of a nationwide (countrywide, if
you prefer) market for mortgages.15 In the period surrounding the
turn of the twenty-first century, exotic and subprime mortgages
came to enjoy a larger share of this newly national market.
16
Banking law changes, it seems, sowed the seeds for a nationwide
real estate decline. These regulatory changes thus undermined a
core assumption upon which they were premised, namely that
such a widespread national decline in residential real estate prices
was extremely unlikely.' 7 Equally perversely, securitization was
seen in the wake of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s as a
vehicle for banks to offload the credit, liquidity, and interest rate
risk of mortgages and other loans.'8 Yet securitization ultimately
became a system that concentrated these very risks and delivered
them back to those banks (and other financial institutions) that
purchased asset-backed securities.19
The history of regulations that permitted banks to participate
in mortgage-backed securitization underscores a larger, recurrent
dilemma beyond the current crisis: whether and how regulation of
bank investments in real estate markets can weaken the potential
12 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
14 See infra Part IV.B.
15 See infra Part I.B.
16 See Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the
Subprime Mortgage Market, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 36-40,
https:#Iresearch.stlouisfed.org/publications/06/O1/ChomPennCross.pdf (commenting on the
market share growth of subprime mortgages from 1995-2003).
17 See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
18 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 18.
19 See infra Part IV.C (remarking on how securitization risks eventually came full circle
back to the originating mortgagers).
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transmission lines between banking and real estate crises. The
current crisis highlights the dangers that real estate can pose for
the banking sector. It is not merely that real estate investments
are more "risky" or illiquid, but, moreover, that they can generate
feedback loops.20 These feedback effects increase risk correlations
and can produce dangerous real estate cycles. When real estate
cycles become linked to banking cycles, the potential for economic
crises metastasizes.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of
how securitization promised to help banks address the credit,
liquidity, and interest rate risks associated with real estate
investments. Securitization served the needs of banks that
originated mortgage loans by offering them a means to exchange
those loans for cash. These originating banks could thus transfer
the credit and interest rate risk associated with these loans and
convert illiquid assets into the most liquid asset of them all, cash.
More importantly, securitization also helped reduce these risks for
banks (and other financial institutions) that purchased mortgage-
backed securities. Part II focuses, in particular, on this second
dynamic of risk reduction for banks purchasing these instruments.
Parts III examines the history of legislative and regulatory
changes that facilitated bank participation in the markets for
mortgage-backed securities. Part IV explains how securitization
failed to mitigate the credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk
associated with real estate when losses in residential markets
became correlated nationwide. Part IV also discusses how
regulation contributed to this, as the spread of securitization and
financial industry consolidation created a nationwide market for
mortgages.
Part V telescopes out from securitization to discuss an often
overlooked danger of bank investments in real estate: the
cyclicality of real estate losses. This Part analyzes the evidence
that real estate prices exhibit positive serial correlation. It also
summarizes historical evidence of the correlation between banking
and real estate crises. This Part then looks at feedback
20 See infra Part V.B.2.
[Vol. 50:89
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mechanisms between banking and real estate markets, including
new economic research into the existence of a bank leverage cycle.
Part VI provides a very high level outline of various approaches
to decoupling bank and real estate crises and the advantages and
drawbacks of various approaches. These approaches include
curbing bank investments in real estate and mortgage-backed
securities, using bank regulations as a more surgical tool to fix
problems with securitization, and developing countercyclical
approaches to regulations of mortgage markets and bank
investments in them. Part VI concludes by discussing the political
dynamics that will shape and constrain any of these policy
approaches.
II. THE RISKS OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS AND
SECURITIZATION'S SOLUTION
Restrictions on bank equity investments in real estate date to
the early years of the republic and often reflected political
concerns with land speculation and, as Professor Malloy explains,
"the fear of large aggregations of economic power that banks'
control of land naturally exacerbated in an agrarian society."
21
U.S. law has generally allowed bank lending secured by real
estate, but placed tight prudential restrictions on this lending
because of three dangers that real estate investments pose for the
financial health of banks. First, real estate investments pose a
high degree of credit risk.22  Second, illiquid real estate
investments can exacerbate the natural liquidity risk faced by
banks.23 Third, real estate lending poses interest rate risks, as a
drop in interest rates could cause real estate borrowers to
21 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION § 5.20, at 193 (2d ed. 2003).
22 The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that the risk inherent in real estate was one of
the three reasons for legal restrictions (such as in 12 U.S.C. § 29) on national bank holdings
of real property. The Court explained: "The object of the restrictions was obviously
threefold. It was to keep the capital of the banks flowing in the daily channels of commerce;
to deter them from embarking in hazardous real-estate speculations; and to prevent the
accumulation of large masses of such property in their hands." Union Nat'l Bank v.
Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, 626 (1878).
23 See Christopher C. Faille, Book Review, FED. LAWYER, May 2008, at 68, 69 (describing
the illiquid nature of real estate).
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refinance. This leaves banks with the unpleasant prospect of
redeploying their cash in a lower interest rate environment, while
potentially paying higher interest rates to their own creditors.
24
All these risks to banks pose larger social costs, as bank failures
create potentially broad spillover effects for the broader economy as
well. Securitization offered to address these three risks for banks
that originated real estate loans. Again, banks could trade the
credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk associated with mortgages by
selling these assets in a securitization in exchange for cash.25
However, by reducing the credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk
associated with purchasing mortgage backed securities,
securitization also promises to help banks on the other end of the
securitization pipeline. To understand the promise of
securitization, it is important to unpack further the credit, liquidity,
and interest rate risk of real estate.
Banks or other institutions may face a more specialized form of
credit risk called concentration risk, which arises when
investments are made within the same geographic or market
sector and thus subject to common shocks.26 Returns and losses on
mortgages in a given real estate market are necessarily correlated.
Economist Martin Hellwig notes that mortgage returns and
property values depend on both common and asset-specific
factors.27 Diversification allows lenders to mitigate the risk of
losses from asset-specific factors, such as the qualities of particular
neighborhoods.28 They cannot, however, diversify away common
factors that affect all properties and mortgages in a particular
market, such as interest rate changes or other macroeconomic
factors like the demise of a large industry.29
24 Sherrill Shaffer, Interest Rate Risk: What's a Bank to Do?, FED. RES. BANK OF
PHILADELPHIA Bus. REV. 17 (May/June 1991).
25 See Alan Kronovet, Note & Comment, An Overview of Commercial Mortgage Backed
Securitization: The Devil Is In the Details, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 288, 288-89 (1997)
(describing securitization).
26 FRANK J. FABOzZI, BOND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 491 (2d ed. 2001).
27 Martin F. Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis, 157 DE ECONOMIST 129, 145 (2009).
28 Id.
29 Id. Losses on one mortgage may trigger losses on others in the same market. Declines in
the price of home sales, or even foreclosures, tend to lower property values in the same
[Vol. 50:89
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Several features of securitization offered to reduce the credit
and concentration risk of mortgage investments. These features
include:
the pooling of assets (such as mortgages) that
back the securities;
30
* the structuring (or tranching) of asset-backed
securities, which gives senior-securities priority
of claims to the cash streams from underlying
assets;
31
* financial guarantees and other credit
enhancements provided by financial institutions
(including by government-sponsored entities
(GSEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac);
32
and
" credit rating agencies providing assessments of
the credit risk of asset-backed securities (and
thus acting as gatekeepers).33
neighborhood. Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2009). Lower property values can put more borrowers
"under water" and induce them to walk away from their properties and default on their
mortgages. But cf. Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the
Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010) (arguing that
emotional factors and social pressures have prevented underwater homeowners from making
the rational economic decision of defaulting on mortgages). A glut of houses on the market,
whether from new construction or foreclosures, could also further depresses prices.
30 Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 147-49
(2009) (explaining how pooling of assets in a securitization furthers diversification and,
ultimately, risk-spreading).
31 For an explanation of tranching in a securitization, see Steven P. Baum, The
Securitization of Commercial Property Debt, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 45, 49 (Leon T.
Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996).
32 Frank J. Fabozzi & Vinod Kothari, Securitization: The Tool of Financial
Transformation (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 07-07, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.comabstract=997079.
33 Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 664-68 (1999) (describing the crucial role of
rating agencies in various securitization transactions).
2015]
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Restrictions on real estate investments by banks are also based
on a second concern, namely the illiquid nature of this asset
class.34 Illiquid assets pose severe risks for banks. A bank's asset-
liability mismatch (i.e., the fact that it holds long term assets but
has short term liabilities, such as demand deposits) makes it
susceptible to bank runs.35 Securitization addresses this liquidity
risk for banks in two ways. First, when banks securitize
mortgages off their own balance sheets, they exchange assets with
long-term maturities for the most liquid asset of all-cash.
36
Second, securitization transforms the cash streams from
mortgages and other assets into theoretically liquid securities for
banks, which can be bought and sold in capital markets.
37
Interest rate risk also poses thorny problems for banks, which
securitization can help solve. As noted above, when interest rates
on mortgages and other loans drop, borrowers will seek to
refinance their loans. Although this means loans will be repaid, it
leaves lenders with prepayment risk, or the unwelcome prospect of
reinvesting the proceeds in a lower interest rate environment. In
addition, banks may face a sudden interest rate mismatch in
which they receive lower payouts on the asset side of their balance
sheet while continuing to owe their creditors fixed interest rates.
Securitization can help banks that originate mortgages with this
risk. By selling mortgages into a securitization, banks reduce the
"asset duration," i.e., the average length of time they hold assets,
and thus shorten the window in which they are subject to interest
34 MALLOY, supra note 21, § 5.20, at 193-94 (describing the liquidity problems with real
estate).
35 For the classic economic model of a bank run, see generally Douglas W. Diamond &
Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983).
36 ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 458, SHADow
BANKING 15 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640545 (describing how securitization helps
lenders address asset-liability mismatch).
37 See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION, supra note 31, at 1, 13-15 ("[Slecuritization's major contribution has been
to convert nonrated, relatively illiquid loans into rated, highly liquid, tradable securities at
attractive market prices."); Gerding, supra note 30, at 149 (explaining how securitization of
asset-backed securities can be structured).
[Vol. 50:89
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rate risk. Of course, securitization transactions merely pass on
interest rate risk to investors in asset-backed securities.38
This is where adjustable rate mortgages can help. Adjustable
rate mortgages (ARMs), which Title VIII of the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 allowed banks to make,39 reset
according to market rates. When packaged in a securitization,
these mortgages ensure that investors will not suffer a drop in
yield should market rates rise. However, interest rate risk can be
a zero sum game; adjustable rate mortgages reallocated interest
rate risks back to borrowers.40 As we will see, however, borrowers
may not have been able to bear this interest rate risk when
interest rates on ARMs reset.
As we will see in Part III, these structural features of
securitization failed to offer durable solutions to the problems of
credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk in real estate investments.
III. LOOSENING LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON BANK PARTICIPATION IN
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS
The promise of securitization to address credit, liquidity, and
interest rate risk of mortgages provided justification for a series of
statutory and regulatory changes that allowed banks to participate
in mortgage-backed securities markets. Before outlining these
changes, it helps to understand the general context of federal
restrictions on bank investments. The concerns of credit, liquidity,
and interest rate risk animated the historical restrictions in U.S.
banking law on the ability of banks to (1) make real estate loans or
purchase real estate-related securities, or (2) underwrite or deal in
mortgage-related securities.41 These two types of legal restrictions
38 Shaffer, supra note 24, at 23-24.
39 Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
40 Emanuel Moench, James Vickery & Diego Aragon, Why Is the Market Share of Adjustable
Rate Mortgages So Low?, 16 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1 (Dec.
2010), available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current issues/ci
16-8.pdf (examining supply and demand factors, including securitization, for ARMs).
41 See MALLOY, supra note 21, § 5.20, at 193 (noting historical legal limitations on banks
when dealing with real property).
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and the relaxation of these restrictions, which accelerated in the
late 1970s and onwards, are surveyed below.
A. BANK INVESTMENTS-MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
The National Bank Act prohibits national banks from
purchasing, holding, and conveying real estate with four major
exceptions.42 One of these exceptions allows banks to acquire real
property through foreclosing on security interests on bank loans.
43
Moreover, federal law permits national banks to make loans
secured by real property.
44
Federal law also contains general restrictions on the ability of
national banks to invest in mortgage-related securities. The
principal statutory restriction on bank investments in securities is
found in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).45  The laundry list of
permissible investments in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) may be
unified less by assets that are inherently safer and more liquid,
and more by various social and political objectives of Congress,
including an interest in channeling capital to particular
42 The four exceptions allow banks to:
(1) Acquire and hold real estate "necessary for its accommodation in the
transaction of its business";
(2) Take mortgages on real property to secure "debts previously
contracted";
(3) Hold real estate acquired "in satisfaction of debts previously contracted
in the course of its dealings"; and
(4) Hold real estate acquired by foreclosing on a debt.
12 U.S.C. § 29 (2012) (First-Fourth).
A later statute expanded national bank powers to allow them to hold real property to
"make investments.., designed primarily to promote the public welfare, including the
welfare of low- and moderate-income communities or families (such as by providing
housing, services, or jobs)." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (Eleventh). See also RICHARD SCOTT
CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 127-28 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that these same restrictions
apply to FDIC-insured banks and similar restrictions apply to FDIC-insured thrifts).
43 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 42, at 127.
44 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012). Banks can engage in real estate lending themselves or
through operating subsidiaries. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION
§ 5.4, at 171 (3d ed. 2011) (citing Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 6 (2007)).
45 12 U.S.C. § 24.
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institutions, markets, and classes of borrowers.46 One prominent
permissible investment category is "investment securities"; the
statute subjects these bank investments to regulations of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).47
Statutory changes over a period of decades enabled banks to
purchase various financial instruments, including mortgage-
backed securities. Some of these changes occurred before the
mortgage-backed securities market took off in the early 1980s.
For example, each time Congress created a government-sponsored
entity that would eventually sponsor mortgage-backed securities-
Fannie Mae in 1938, GNMA in 1968, and Freddie Mac in 1970-it
soon amended 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) to allow national banks to
purchase the entity's securities.48  The securities of these
46 See generally Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Safe Assets (Sept. 2, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing how regulations of bank balance sheets reflect
political and policy choices to channel credit to certain borrowers).
47 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
48 In 1938, Congress created the National Mortgage Association of Washington, the
predecessor of GNMA and Fannie Mae, as a wholly owned corporate instrument of the
federal government. Records of the Federal National Mortgage Association § 294.1, NA'r'L
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/294.html (last visited
Nov. 20, 2015). Congress added the "obligations of national mortgage associations" to the
list of permissible investments by national banks. National Housing Act Amendments of
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-424, § 13, 52 Stat. 8, 26 (1938).
Shortly thereafter, the name of the National Mortgage Association of Washington was
changed to the "Federal National Mortgage Association." Jo Anne Bradner, Comment, The
Secondary Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Real Estate Financing, 36 EMORY L.J.
971, 975-76, 976 n.18 (1987). Congress granted a charter to this entity in 1948. Act of July
1, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-864, § 301(a), 62 Stat. 1206, 1207 (1948).
In 1954, Congress re-chartered the firm to conduct secondary mortgage market
operations. Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, § 201-07, 68 Stat. 590, 612-22 (1954)
(amending Title III of the National Housing Act). With that same act, Congress changed 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) to allow national banks to invest in "obligations of the Federal
National Mortgage Association" instead of "obligations of national mortgage associations."
Id. § 203, 68 Stat. at 622.
In 1968, Congress split the entity into Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae. Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No 90-448, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 476, 536-46 (1968).
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) was again amended to allow national banks to invest in the
obligations of both entities. Id. § 802(j), 82 Stat. at 545.
In 1974, Congress amended 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) again to permit national banks to
invest in obligations of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 805(c)(1), 88 Stat.
633, 726 (1974).
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government-sponsored firms originally consisted of their capital
stock. When these firms began issuing and guaranteeing
mortgage-backed securities, however, the past amendments to 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) allowed banks to purchase them.
49
Regulatory change enabling bank participation in mortgage
securitization accelerated in the 1980s, a period of broad
deregulation of bank and thrift investments in real estate.
50
Congress again amended this same statutory provision, 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (Seventh), by passing the Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act of 1984 (SMMEA). 51  SMMEA loosened Glass-
Steagall's restrictions on the ability of national banks to purchase
privately issued mortgage-backed securities.5 2 These are mortgage-
backed securities issued by institutions other than the government-
sponsored entities and are often called "private label" securities.
5 3
More precisely, SMMEA removed restrictions so long as the
mortgage-backed securities purchased were investment grade.
54
49 The language of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) allows banks to invest in the "obligations,
participations, or other instruments of or issued by" these entities. This statutory provision
also allows banks to purchase obligations of other entities active in secondary mortgage
markets, such as obligations of Federal Home Loan Banks.
50 See, e.g., MATTHEW SHERMAN, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, A SHORT HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (2009), available at http://www.cepr.
net/documents/publications/dereg-timeline-2009-07.pdf (discussing The Garn-St. Germain Act
and deregulation of thrifts and their ability to make commercial real estate investments).
51 Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, tit. I, 98
Stat. 1689, 1689-92 (1984) [hereinafter SMMEA]. For a history and analysis of the statute
as it relates to investments by depository institutions in mortgage-backed securities, see
David Abelman, The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act, 14 REAL EST. L.J. 136,
142-44 (1985).
52 SMMEA § 105(c), 98 Stat. at 1691 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24); see also
Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV.
827, 854-56 (2009) (discussing how SMMEA allowed FDIC financial institutions to invest in
private-label mortgage backed securities).
53 For a discussion of the development of private label mortgage-backed securities, see
David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REv. 1019, 1030-33 (2008).
54 SMMEA allowed investments in "mortgage related securities" as that term is defined
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(41) (2012). SMMEA § 105(c), 98
Stat. at 1691 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24). The statute also allowed investments
in securities sold to "accredited investors" under the Securities Exchange Act. Id.
(permitting investments that are "offered and sold pursuant to section 4(5) of the Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77d(5))").
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The Act also loosened restrictions on the ability of thrifts 5 and
credit unions5 6 to invest in mortgage-backed securities, including
private label securities. Furthermore, SMMEA preempted state
laws that would have imposed restrictions on investing in those
same categories of mortgage-backed securities.57 Congress thus
removed any requirement that private label mortgage-backed
securities be registered under state blue sky laws.58
As amended, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) continued to subject
purchases by national banks of private label mortgage-backed
securities to regulations by the OCC.5 9 In 1996, the OCC exercised
this power to pass a set of rules on the security investments that
national banks could make.60 These rules place certain mortgage-
backed securities in a category that allowed for unlimited
purchases.61 Federal thrifts enjoyed even more freedom than
national banks; the Office of Thrift Supervision did not pass
regulations specifically limiting their ability to invest in mortgage-
backed securities.6
2
55 SMMEA § 105(a), 98 Stat. at 1691 (amending the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933, 12
U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1) (2012)).
56 SMMEA § 105(b) (amending the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (2012)).
57 SMMEA § 106 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r-1 (2012)).
58 Patricia A. McCoy & Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and
Nontraditional Home Mortgages 8 n.40 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., Paper
No. UCC08-5, 2008), auailable at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sitesjchs.harvard.edu/filesu
cc08-5_mccoyrenuart.pdf.
59 Even today, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) restricts bank purchases of investment securities
to "such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation
prescribe."
60 Investment Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,972 (Dec. 2, 1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 7).
61 See THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 12:8 (2015) ("As a
general matter, national banks can invest in certain residential [Mortgage-Backed
Securities (MBS)] and commercial MBS-those that have received investment grade ratings
and are issued under Section 4(5) of the 1933 Act-with no limitations."); see also 12 C.F.R.
§ 1.3(e) (2013) ("The amount of Type IV securities that a bank may purchase and sell is not
limited to a specified percentage of the bank's capital and surplus.").
62 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks & Financial Institutions § 578 (2015).
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B. PERMITTING BANKS TO ISSUE AND DEAL IN MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES
The Glass-Steagall provisions at 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) restrict
the ability of depository institutions to engage "in the business of
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing" securities for their
own account.63  A series of interpretations by federal bank
regulators, however, allowed banks to issue and deal in mortgage-
backed securities.64 Beginning in 1977 and throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, the OCC issued a series of interpretations that used a
proviso to this statutory prohibition to allow national banks to
expand incrementally into the issuance, underwriting, and dealing
of mortgage-backed securities.65  One crucial 1987 OCC
interpretation withstood court challenges by the Securities
Industry of America that sought to protect the turf of securities
underwriters, which were then still separated from banks by
Glass-Steagall.
66
The power of national banks to issue and underwrite mortgage-
backed securities (and other asset-backed securities) prompted the
Federal Reserve Board to issue its own set of regulatory
interpretations under the Glass-Steagall Act to permit bank
holding companies to conduct the same activities.67  These
interpretations also survived court challenges by the securities
industry.68 The Federal Reserve also issued another series of
63 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (2012); see also LEMKE ET AL., supra note 61, § 12:8 (discussing
restrictions on the issuance, sale, and purchase of mortgage-backed securities).
MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 13.02[A] (4th ed. 2015).
65 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 61, § 12:8. The Glass-Steagall Act prohibition included the
following proviso, which remains even in current law: "[N]othing in this paragraph shall be
construed as affecting in any way such right as any bank, banking association, savings
bank, trust company, or other banking institution, may otherwise possess to sell, without
recourse or agreement to repurchase, obligations evidencing loans on real estate .... " 12
U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (2015). For a description of the series of OCC interpretations that
allowed banks to issue and sell mortgage-backed securities (and other asset-backed
securities), see FEIN, supra note 64, § 13.02[A].
6 Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989). For an analysis of the case,
see FEIN, supra note 64, §§ 4.05[C] [6], 13.02[A].
67 FEIN, supra note 64, § 13.02[B].
68 Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
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interpretations permitting these activities under a separate
statute, the Bank Holding Company Act.
69
C. POTENTIAL SUBSIDY TRANSFERS FROM BANKS TO NON-BANK
MORTGAGE AFFILIATES
These liberal interpretations of Glass-Steagall became largely
academic with the partial but sweeping repeal of that statute in
2000.70 Repeal, however, merely moved the goal posts in the
efforts by the financial industry to obtain regulatory relief. As
described below, in the last decade, regulators allowed banks to
support mortgage-backed securities markets in subtler ways; they
allowed banks to extend credit to, and purchase assets from, non-
bank affiliates involved in mortgage lending. In the aftermath of
Glass-Steagall's demise, scholars feared that financial
conglomerates would exploit the explicit subsidies afforded to
depository banks to gamble with taxpayer money.7 1 Although
banking laws contained provisions to prevent this subsidy leakage
from banks to non-bank affiliates, scholars questioned their
effectiveness.
72
Law professor Saule Omarova provides a clear example of
regulators weakening rules designed to prevent subsidy leakage.
She argues that the demise of Glass-Steagall division placed much
of the work for counteracting subsidy leakage on an obscure
Depression-era statutory provision, section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act.73 Section 23A imposes quantitative limitations on
certain extensions of credit and other transactions between a bank
and its affiliates that would expose a bank to an affiliate's credit or
69 FEIN, supra note 64, § 13.02[B].
70 See id. § 13.02[c] (explaining that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also amended the Bank
Holding Company Act to permit financial holding companies and subsidiaries of banks to
issue and sell mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities).
71 See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1689-90 (2011)
(discussing the implications of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
72 Id. at 1691-93 (examining provisions governing banks who subject their operations to
affiliate risk).
73 Id. at 1687.
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investment risk.74 That same provision also prohibits banks from
purchasing low-quality assets from their nonbank affiliates.
7 5 It
further imposes strict collateral requirements with respect to
extensions of credit by banks to non-bank affiliates.76 Omarova
details how banks sought exemptions from these strictures "to
leverage their subsidiary banks' high credit ratings and access to
cheap sources of funding to increase profitability of their nonbank
subsidiaries."77  The Federal Reserve granted numerous
exemptions from 1996 until 2010 to allow financial conglomerates
to use their bank affiliates to support loans by non-banks.78 For
example, between 2000 and 2006, the Federal Reserve gave
Citigroup multiple exemptions to allow its banking subsidiary to
purchase subprime mortgage assets from a series of mortgage
lenders that Citigroup acquired.79 Omarova argues that these
exemptions enabled Citigroup to expand its non-banking mortgage
lending operations and to reap profits from securitization.
80
D. CAPITAL REGULATIONS
Even after banks were permitted to invest in mortgage-backed
securities, those investments have still been subject to regulatory
capital requirements and other prudential bank regulations.
81
Here too, bank regulators initiated rule changes that encouraged
bank investments in mortgage-backed securities.8 2 Bank capital
regulations placed mortgage-backed securities in preferential
categories; these regulations assigned mortgage-backed securities
lower risk-weights and thus required banks to hold less regulatory
74 Id. at 1693.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1707.
78 See id. at 1708 (describing exemptions allowing bank affiliates to purchase assets such
as mortgage and hedge fund loans).
79 See id. at 1709-14 (explaining Citigroup's exemptions from section 234 and its
substantial "exposure to toxic subprime mortgage assets").
80 Id.
81 Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal Origins 40-41 (Aug. 23,
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capital against those instruments than against comparable
securities.83
The lighter capital treatment of mortgage-backed securities
turned them into attractive instruments for engaging in regulatory
capital arbitrage.8 4  Securitization helped facilitate regulatory
capital arbitrage by unbundling and re-bundling the risk from the
assets underlying a securitization and then stuffing more risk into
a particular tranche of securities.8 5 The tranche would thus bear
more risk than its regulatory risk-weight.86  Some scholars
attribute a significant portion of the increase in securitization in
the years immediately before the global financial crisis to banks
engaging in regulatory capital arbitrage.8 7 These scholars fault
this use of securitization for undermining regulatory capital rules,
83 Id. at 40-44 (commenting on the other end of the securitization pipeline, stating that
regulators constantly struggled to readjust the regulatory capital requirements for banks
that securitized mortgages and other assets). Often banks that sell off assets to
securitization vehicles have some level of recourse exposure for those assets. Id.
Commentators have faulted regulators for requiring too little capital for the risk that
securitizing banks retained. See id. (describing recourse of sellers and sponsors in many
types of securitizations).
84 Id. at 43-44.
85 Id. at 1, 42.
86 Id.; see also Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Fed. Res. Sys., Financial Globalization and
Efficient Banking Regulation, Remarks Before the Annual Washington Conference of the
Institute of International Bankers (Mar. 2, 1998), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980302.htm (explaining that some senior regulators
recognized the dangers of banks who used securitization as a means of regulatory arbitrage).
See generally David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory
Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35 (2000) (describing ways in
which banks use securitization to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage); Viral V. Acharya et
al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, in REGULATING WALL STREET:
THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 143 (Viral V.
Acharya et al eds. 2011) (arguing that banks widely exploited securitization for regulatory
capital arbitrage in years before the crisis).
87 See Acharya et al., supra note 86, at 147-50 (explaining how banks circumscribed the
Basel accords to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage through securitization); see also ERIK
F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 259-60 (2014) (explaining that
securitization facilitated a system that "did not diffuse risk, but hid, recycled and concentrated
it in complex daisy chains"); Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial
Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 201-04 (2009) (describing various means of regulatory
arbitrage); Viral V. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15730, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl
5730.pdf (explaining the use of "conduits" in regulatory arbitrage schemes).
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masking the leverage and systemic risk of important financial
institutions, and thus contributing significantly to the severity of
the crisis.88
IV. CORRELATIONS: MISPRICING MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
The regulatory changes described in Part III were largely
premised on the ability of mortgage-backed securities to mitigate
credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk, as described in Part II.
The greater investment by banks in mortgage-backed securities
and the functioning of mortgage-backed securities markets relied
heavily on the prices of these instruments accurately reflecting
credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk.
Yet correlations in losses among mortgages and other assets
underlying a securitization can suddenly increase. When this
occurred in the subprime crisis, it revealed significant and
widespread mispricing of the credit, liquidity, and interest rate
risk of mortgage-backed securities.89  Moreover, errors in
mispricing one issue of asset-backed securities can become
magnified every time those securities are re-securitized. So small
errors in pricing securities backed by mortgages cause even larger
errors in the pricing of a second securitization, a collateralized
debt obligation (CDO), created when those initial asset-backed
securities are pooled and used to back another issuance of asset-
backed securities.90 The errors increase even further when CDO
securities are themselves securitized (called a CDO-squared, or
CDO2).91  Unexpected increases in correlation on mortgage
88 See Acharya et al., supra note 86, at 147-50 (explaining how banks used various
methodologies to double balance sheets from 2004 to 2007 while only nominally increasing
their "regulated" risk); GERDING, supra note 87, at 259-60.
89 See Joshua Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3,
17-19 (2009) (explaining how investors may have been 'lured" into investing in structural
finance instruments without fully appreciating the inherent risks, which means they
received a lower yield than they should have).
90 Id. at 21.
91 See id. at 17, 21, 23 (recognizing that small errors are significantly magnified by the
CDO structure).
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defaults contributed to the freezing of the asset-backed securities
markets and to the severity of the subprime crisis.
92
To understand how this transpired, it is important first to
understand how diversification in the mortgages underlying
mortgage-backed securities may fail to mitigate risk. Then it is
critical to see how securitization and regulatory changes-
particularly those changes that enabled massive financial industry
consolidation-contributed to the formation of a national real
estate market in which mortgage underwriting became more risky
and more homogenized. This national market created the
possibility for correlated mortgage losses around the country and a
national housing market crash.
A. THE INADEQUACIES OF DIVERSIFICATION
As noted above, common risk exposure factors increase the
possibility of correlated losses on all mortgages in a given real
estate market. Although many different mortgages may back a
particular issuance of mortgage-backed securities, if many of those
mortgages default at the same time, investors in the securities will
suffer losses nonetheless. These common factors increase not only
the correlation of default risk among mortgages in the market but,
moreover, the correlation of losses on mortgage-backed securities
based on those mortgages as well.9 3 High correlation of default
risk in mortgages undermines the diversification benefits of
pooling assets.94 Correlation in default risk for mortgages also
translates into high correlation of risk among entirely separate
issuances of mortgage-backed securities.95  Distinct pools of
mortgages may experience defaults at the same moment,
92 See Hellwig, supra note 27, at 145 (noting the effect of correlations on mortgage-backed
securities).
93 See id. (describing the decrease in effectiveness of mortgage-backed securities due to
the correlation of default risks and mortgage securities).
94 See id. (explaining how default probabilities undermine the diversification of securities
investments).
95 See id. at 145, 152, 155 (noting how correlated default risk may still affect separate
securities issuances).
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frustrating the ability of investors to diversify by purchasing
different issues of mortgage-backed securities.
Martin Hellwig contends that historical data and statistical
analysis inadequately measures fluctuations in the correlations of
default risk on mortgages or losses on mortgage-backed
securities.96 Difficulties predicting correlations make the true
value of mortgage-backed securities uncertain.97 This uncertainty
undermines the rationale for allowing banks to invest in these
questionably safe classes of instruments.
B. THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET AND AN
"UNTHINKABLE" NATIONWIDE REAL ESTATE BUST: SECURITIZATION
AND FINANCIAL CONSOLIDATION
The analysis above discusses the correlations of prices, returns,
and losses in a given real estate market. In the United States,
market participants and policymakers before the crisis seemed to
have assumed that the country was composed of numerous distinct
real estate markets. Although particular markets suffered busts
(for example, Texas in the 1980s), a nationwide decline in housing
prices had not occurred since the Great Depression, and prominent
policymakers believed recurrence was unlikely.
98
The current crisis betrayed this confidence as housing prices
dropped in real estate markets countrywide.99 The correlation
9 Id. at 159-60.
97 Erik F. Gerding, supra note 30, at 172-73 (2009) (discussing how unexpected
correlations undermine the value of securitization).
98 Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24businessleconomy/24panel.html?_r=O (reporting
that Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan dismissed concerns about permissive financial
regulation because "housing prices had never endured a nationwide decline and that a bust
was highly unlikely"). Markus Brunnermeier explains how securitization relied on low
mortgage default rates and suffered a blind spot: "[P]ast downturns in housing prices were
primarily regional phenomena-the United States had not experienced a nationwide decline
in housing prices in the period following World War II. The assumed low cross-regional
correlation of house prices generated a perceived diversification benefit hat especially boosted
the valuations of AAA-rated tranches...." Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the
Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 81 (2009).
99 Dwight Jaffee et al., Mortgage Origination and Securitization in the Financial Crisis,
in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 61, 66-67 (Viral V.
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between housing prices in once-separate regional markets can be
explained, in part, by two factors: the advent of securitization and
the increased consolidation in the real estate lending and financial
services industry.
1. Securitization and the Spread of Risky Mortgage
Underwriting. The growth of mortgage-backed securities created a
demand for securities from different regional markets to facilitate
pooling and diversification.100 Securitization also required some
degree of standardization in underwriting standards to ensure the
quality of mortgages and to price securitizations.10 1 Restricting the
GSEs to mortgages that met certain credit risk and other criteria
created a market space for private label mortgage-backed
securities.10 2  When some private label securitizations began
reaping profits from subprime and exotic mortgages, it spurred
copycat securitizations.0 3 Subprime mortgage originations were
dispersed across multiple regions.104 Ultimately, even the GSEs
entered the subprime market by purchasing subprime mortgages
and private label mortgage-backed securities collateralized by
Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) (citing statistics of housing price declines after
crisis hit).
100 See FRANK J. FABOzzI & JOHN N. DuNLEVY, REAL ESTATE-BACKED SECURITIES 142
(2001) (describing residential mortgage-backed securities investors' demands for geographic
diversification in pools of mortgages).
101 See MEGAN DORSEY & DAVID ROCKWELL, FINANCING RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 29
(13th ed. 2005) (describing the need for and development of standardized loan underwriting
and documentation standards).
102 See Reiss, supra note 53, at 1030-33 (describing the development of the private label
securitization market).
103 Erik F. Gerding, Deregulation Pas de Deux. Dual Regulatory Classes of Financial
Institutions and the Path to Financial Crisis in Sweden and the United States, 15 NExUS
J.L. & POL'Y 135, 152-53 (2010). See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Federal Preemption,
Regulatory Failure, and the Race to the Bottom in U.S. Mortgage Lending Standards, in
THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 132 (Lawrence
E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010) (arguing that the race to the bottom in
mortgage lending standards was enabled by federal preemption of state consumer finance
laws and fragmented U.S. systems of financial regulation).
104 For a regional analysis of the dispersion of subprime mortgage origination, see
Christopher J. Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to Whom?
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper, No. 14083, 2008), available at http://www.
nber.org/papers/w14083.pdf.
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subprime mortgages for their own investment portfolios.105 Several
studies have suggested that securitization led to lax screening of
mortgage loans.106
Even if lax screening did not occur, securitization drove the
nationwide diffusion of subprime mortgage origination. Kathleen
Engel and Patricia McCoy provide a detailed history of how
investors seeking higher yields on asset-backed securities had
downstream effects; securitization vehicles sought particular types
of exotic mortgages such as hybrid adjustable-rate-mortgages
(ARMs), interest-only ARMs, and pay-option ARMs.107 These
mortgage contracts increased the risk of a payment shock for
borrowers if interest rates reset to a higher rate.108 At the same
time, securitization drove the increasing spread of high loan-to-
value ratio mortgages to subprime mortgagors.0 9 This meant that
when a shock hit, borrowers were more likely to default, and asset-
based securities investors exposed to those securities had little
cushion to protect their investments.110
The risk to financial institutions investing in asset-backed
securities was not that a payment shock would cause individual
mortgages to default. After all, securitization was supposed to
hedge the risk of default by having a geographically diversified
pool of mortgages."' Realistically, geographic diversification was
undermined because the same exotic and subprime mortgages
105 See Gerding, supra note 103, at 153-54 (describing Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae's
purchase of riskier subprime mortgage instruments).
106 See, e.g., Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence
from Subprime Loans, 125 Q. J. ECON. 307, 354 (2010) ("[W]e conclude from our empirical
analysis that there was a causal link between ease of securitization and screening.");
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia et al., Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence From the
Subprime Mortgage Market 31 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 6683,
2008) ("[W]e find evidence that [credit] standards declined more where the credit boom was
larger."). But see Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Securitization and Moral Hazard: Evidence
from Credit Score Cutoff Rules, 63 J. MONETARY ECON. 1, 17 (2014) (contesting the claim
that securitization led to lax screening of mortgages by originators).
107 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 34-35.
108 Id. at 34.
109 Id. at 35.
110 Id. at 35, 40.
111 Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1327, 1332 (2009).
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with the same payment shock risks were being extended across the
nation.112
Securitization was to blame. Securitizations require two
features. First, some standardization of the types of assets
purchased by the securitization vehicle is needed to enable
purchasers and intermediaries to review and price the credit
quality of those assets.113  Standardization could mean
securitization contracts would specify that a certain minimum
percentage of the assets in the pool would have certain contractual
features, for example ARMs. 114 Second, securitized assets must be
purchased from different geographic regions.1 5  These two
features, combined with a demand for higher-yielding mortgages,
meant that the same type of mortgages subject to the same types
of payment shocks were being offered around the United States.
16
When the payment shock hit, waves of borrower defaults hit
multiple regional mortgage markets at roughly the same time.
117
This caused unexpected levels of correlated losses within the pools
of individual securitizations."8 But the problem was not limited to
individual securitizations. The standardization across
112 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 229 (2011)
[hereinafter INQUIRY REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/G
PO-FCIC.pdf (relating Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke's testimony that he "did not
recognize... the extent to which the system had flaws and weaknesses in it that were going
to amplify the initial shock from subprime and make it into a much bigger crisis").
113 See McCoy et al., supra note 111, at 1375 ("[Clreating centralized, standardized
markets for the trading of ... mortgage-backed securities would facilitate the short-selling
needed to keep asset prices at fundamental levels.").
114 See Michael G. Crouhy et al., The Subprime Credit Crisis of 2007, 16 J. DERIVATIVES
81, 84 (2008) (describing the alignment of "covenants structured to generate a desired credit
rating in order to meet investor demand").
115 McCoy et al., supra note 111, at 1332.
116 See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 112, at 102 (noting how "nonprime loans" grew to
comprise the largest share in the market for house loans).
117 See id. at 129 ("Across the country, in regions where subprime and Alt-A mortgages were
heavily concentrated, borrowers would default in large numbers. This was not how it was
supposed to work. Losses in one region were supposed to be offset by successful loans in
another region."). Some commentators, however, point to data that many mortgage defaults
began before interest rates on ARMs reset, which would indicate that mortgages were
extended to borrowers who could not make payments in a favorable interest rate environment.
See Les Christie, Subprime Loans Defaulting Even Before Resets, CNNMoney (Feb. 20, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/20/real-estate/loans-failingpre_resets/.
118 INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 112, at 129.
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securitization markets led different securitization vehicles to
purchase the same types of exotic mortgages subject to the same
types of payment shocks.119 This meant that losses on particular
classes of mortgages affected wide swaths of the securitization
market, including banks that regulatory changes had enabled to
invest in that market.120 Securitization undermined the
diversification upon which it relied and upon which regulatory
changes loosening restrictions on bank investments in mortgage-
related securities were premised.'21 Fire sales of asset-backed
securities began, liquidity in securitization markets evaporated,
and vicious feedback loops began to form.
122
2. Financial Industry Consolidation and Regulatory Change.
Profits from securitization, particularly from securitizing subprime
mortgages, spurred banking and investment banking-based
conglomerates to purchase mortgage originators with large
subprime businesses.123 These purchases fit within a larger wave
of financial industry consolidation, across both geographic regions
and financial sectors (banking, investment banking, insurance,
mortgage lending, etc.), in the wake of the progressive
disintegration and ultimate repeal of Glass-Steagall.124  The
demise of Glass-Steagall followed the removal of various
geographic restrictions on national and state banks that occurred
over a much longer period.
25
119 See id. at 102, 129 (noting the market share growth of subprime loans, which were
subject to similar default risks).
120 See id. at 155, 433 (discussing how the losses on the housing market affected largely
unconnected firms, many of which were "systemically important institutions").
121 See id. at 328 (noting how ratings agencies had put too much faith in diversification to
prevent systemic loss on mortgage-backed securities investments).
122 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1372-73 (2011) (discussing how imprudent
financial policy causes liquidity problems, fire sales in markets, and feedback effects).
123 See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 57 ("To ensure a constant supply of loans to feed
their securitization machines, arrangers bought subprime lenders and made them captive.").
124 For a definitive account of this consolidation and the role law played in it, see Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risk, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 250-61.
125 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 42, at 25-27 (describing the rise of branch and
interstate banking and the fall of Glass-Steagall).
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Legal changes resulted in large financial conglomerates
increasingly engaging in transregional mortgage lending
operations and acquiring larger shares of the mortgage lending
market.126 The market share of the mortgage origination business
held by the top three mortgage lenders almost doubled from 19.4%
to 36.6% between 1998 and 2007.127 By 2007, the ten largest
mortgage originators in the United States had a combined 71.7%
share of this market.
128
Note that one of the prime justifications for financial industry
consolidation was to allow financial institutions to diversify.129
Diversification via consolidation, like diversification offered by
pooling mortgages from different parts of the country, helped
create a national market for underwriting mortgages.130 This
national market, the diffusion of financial innovation, and
competitive pressures fostered the spread of exotic and subprime
mortgages.131 Thus diversification via consolidation undermined
itself by homogenizing real estate lending in regional markets.
Moreover, even nominally independent mortgage lenders were
often tightly connected via funding networks to a small number of
large financial conglomerates that provided financing to, and
purchased securities from, these lenders.132 This means that the
data on banking consolidation in mortgage lending and
126 Jaffee et al., supra note 99, at 67.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Wilmarth, supra note 124, at 444.
130 See William C. Apgar & Allen J. Fishbein, The Changing Industrial Organization of
Housing Finance and the Changing Role of Community-Based Organizations 3-4 (Joint Ctr.
for Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., Working Paper, No. BABC 04-9, 2004) (describing how
banking industry consolidation contributed to "the rapidly expanding subprime lending
industry").
131 See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 112, at 11 ("The companies issuing [nontraditional]
loans made profits that attracted envious eyes. New lenders entered the field. Investors
clamored for mortgage-related securities and borrowers wanted mortgages. The volume of
subprime and nontraditional lending rose sharply.").
132 See generally Richard Stanton, Johan Walden & Nancy Wallace, The Industrial
Organization of the US Residential Mortgage Market, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 259 (2014)
(noting the risk created when "nominally independent" financial entities are heavily
interrelated to the operation of large financial institutions).
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securitization markets may understate the true concentration of
risk in the industry in the run-up to the crisis.
133
C. WAREHOUSE AND RECOURSE RISK FOR ORIGINATING BANKS
The collapse of investor demand for mortgage-backed securities
in the subprime crisis also impacted banks that originated
mortgages for distribution to securitization vehicles. 134
Originating banks (and other mortgage lenders) were subject to
warehouse risk, i.e., the risk of being unable to sell mortgages they
originated and offload the credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk
associated with those loans.
135
Moreover, even when banks successfully sell loans for a
securitization, they may also have recourse obligations for those
assets.136  Although accounting and bank regulatory capital
standards may have treated the likelihood of these obligations
being triggered as remote, these obligations caused significant
losses for banks and other financial institutions.137 Indeed, large
financial institutions that sold mortgages into securitizations have
agreed to settlements totaling billions of dollars because those
mortgages violated representations and warranties about
mortgage quality and underwriting standards. This massive
recourse liability meant that a significant amount of risk that
banks moved off their balance sheets in securitizations eventually
rematerialized on their financial statements.
138
133 Id. at 287.
134 See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 112, at 74 (explaining how mortgage originators were
adversely affected when investor demand for "risky assets" sharply declined).
135 Adrian D'Silva & Brian Gordon, Hedges in the Warehouse: The Banks Get Trimmed,
(Fin. Mkts. Grp., Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Policy Discussion Paper, No. 2008-5, 2008),
available at http://www.chicagofed.orgldigital-assetspublications/policy-discussionpapers/
2008/PDP2008-5.pdf.
136 See Gerding, supra note 81, at 42 (giving an example of when a bank may be exposed
to a recourse obligation). Securitization sponsors may also have obligations to warehouse
lenders. See Stanton, Walden & Wallace, supra note 132, at 271 (relating New Century's
inability to pay the margin calls made by its warehouse lenders).
137 See Stanton, Walden & Wallace, supra note 132, at 271 (discussing New Century's
inability to satisfy its obligations).
138 E.g., Andrew Grossman & Christina Rexrode, Citigroup to Pay $7 Billion in Mortgage
Probe, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2014, http://www.wsj.con/articles/citigroup-to-pay-7-billion-to-
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V. IT'S NOT JUST RISK, IT'S CYCLICALITY
Taking a step back from the failures of securitization during the
financial crisis, any form of bank investment in real estate can
pose risks because of the cyclicality of real estate markets, the
historical links between real estate and banking crises, and the
cyclicality of bank leverage.
A. POSITIVE SERIAL CORRELATION OF REAL ESTATE PRICES
Empirical studies document positive serial correlation in the
prices of residential real estate.139 Positive serial correlation, in
lay terms, means that when prices rise, they continue to rise, and
when they fall, they continue to fall.140 Positive serial correlation
can translate into boom and bust cycles in real estate markets.14,
Extended boom times in financial markets can mask mispricing of
risk by market participants. For example, if models used to price
risk and financial instruments (i.e., asset-backed securities) use
historical data that does not reach back to before the boom, the
models may underestimate risk.142 Furthermore, long cycles-and
resolve -mortgage-probe- 1405335864.
139 See, e.g., Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, The Efficiency of the Market for Single-
Family Homes, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 125 (1989) (examining the economic efficiency of real
estate markets in four American cities and finding that positive serial correlation may
exist); Peter Englund & Yannis M. Ioannides, House Price Dynamics: An International
Empirical Perspective, 6 J. HOUSING ECON. 119, 133 (1997) (finding correlation of house
prices within fifteen OECD countries); Peter Englund, John M. Quigley & Christian L.
Redfearn, Improved Price Indexes for Real Estate: Measuring the Course of Swedish
Housing Prices, 44 J. URBAN EcoN. 171, 195 (1998) (finding positive serial correlation in
Swedish residential real estate); Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Housing Dynamics
2-3 (Apr. 21, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://realestate.wharton.upenn.edu/newsne
wsletter/pdf/may07.pdf (documenting positive serial correlation for new construction).
140 See Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, Systemic Risk from Real Estate and Macro-
Prudential Regulation 8 (Aug. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.federalreser
ve.gov/events/conferences/2011/rsr/papers/AllenCarletti.pdf ("[O]nce a real estate boom has
started it is likely that it will persist for some time. Similarly for a bust, once real estate
prices have started to fall this is likely to continue.").
141 Id. (noting various boom and bust cycles in Miami and Los Angeles).
142 See Gerding, supra note 30, at 141 (noting the pitfalls of value-at-risk models when
assumptions are based on incomplete or unreliable historical data).
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a long period since the last real estate crisis-may induce "disaster
myopia" in both market participants and regulators.
143
B. CORRELATIONS AND LINKAGES BETWEEN REAL ESTATE AND BANK
CRISES
1. Historical Data. A wealth of studies reveal another kind of
correlation that is, perhaps, most troublesome for bank
investments in real estate markets. Surveys of banking crises
across countries and throughout history reveal a close correlation
between real estate crises and banking crises. Carmen Reinhart
and Kenneth Rogoff document a post-World War II pattern of real
estate prices booming before major banking crises, declining the
year a banking crisis hit, and continuing to decline for a period of
several years afterwards.144 Their dataset shows that this pattern
holds in both developed and emerging market countries.145 In
looking at developed countries in the period from 1970 to 2001,
Michael Bordo and Olivier Jeanne found a pattern of banking
crises occurring either at the height of a real estate boom or
immediately following a crash.146 In another study that looked at
housing price data before forty-six banking crises, a boom and bust
in real estate prices preceded more than two-thirds of those
crises.147 In that same study, banking crises followed thirty-five
143 Richard J. Herring & Susan Wachter, Real Estate Booms and Banking Busts: An
International Perspective 12-18 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Paper No. 99-27, 1999), http://fic.
wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/99/99
27.pdf (explaining "disaster myopia" as a risk that banks
and regulators will fail to adequately account for the risk of a shock, which has historically
occurred with low frequency but still presents significant potential for financial loss that
should not be discounted).
144 CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 159 (2009); see also Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S.
Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Subprime Crisis So Different? An International Historical
Comparison, 98 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 339, 342 (2008) (noting the patterns that are
characteristic of financial crises).
145 REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 144, at 159-61.
146 Michael D. Bordo & Olivier Jeanne, Boom-Busts in Asset Prices, Economic Instability,
and Monetary Policy 9-10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8966, 2002),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8966.pdf.
147 Christopher Crowe et al., How to Deal with Real Estate Booms: Lessons from Country
Experiences 5 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/91, 2011), available at http:/!
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
2Ol1/wpl l91.pdf.
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out of fifty-one real estate boom and bust cycles. 48 Other
economists have documented links between banking crises (or
series of banking crises) in specific countries and real estate boom
and bust periods. 1
49
2. Feedback Mechanisms. A number of feedback mechanisms
can explain this historical correlation between bank and real
estate crises. Bank investment in real estate markets creates a
potential connecting rod between the two. Real estate loans and
investments by banks can fuel real estate booms. Indeed,
Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale have developed models of asset
price bubbles in which credit fuels the formation of a bubble.1 50
Rising real estate prices can, in turn, fuel bank profits, lower the
rate of loan defaults, and stimulate greater lending.151 These
feedback loops can lurch in reverse when real estate prices drop.
Loan defaults then rise and bank losses increase. This may cause
banks to curtail lending.152 Restricted lending can cause defaults
to rise further.
Moreover, plummeting residential real estate prices can have
significant consequences for the broader economy through various
148 Id.; see also Allen & Carletti, supra note 140, at 7 ("There is extensive evidence that
the most important cause of banking crises is real estate booms and busts.").
149 E.g., Herring & Wachter, supra note 143, at 30 (noting the effect of post-World War II
farmland boom and bust on the "failure of more than sixty agricultural banks"). For a
discussion of the link between the three banking crises in Norway from the 1890s to the
1990s and real estate booms and busts, see Karsten R. Gerdrup, Three Episodes of
Financial Fragility in Norway Since the 1890's (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper
No. 142, 2003), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work142.pdf.
150 Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Bubbles and Crises, 110 ECON. J. 236, 239 (2000); see
also Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Asset Price Bubbles and Stock Market Interlinkages, in
ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY, REGULATORY, AND INTERNATIONAL
POLICIES 323 (William C. Hunter et al. eds., 2003) ("Stock market interlinkages have played
an important role in the formation and collapse of bubbles from early times."); Franklin Allen
& Douglas Gale, Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL CRISES 19 (Meghnad Desai & Yahia Said eds., 2004) ("[W]here asset prices have
risen and then collapsed dramatically, an expansion in credit following financial liberalization
appears to have been an important factor.").
15, See Ian Christensen, Mortgage Debt and Procyclicality in the Housing Market, 2001
BANK OF CAN. REV. 35, 37, available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/201
1/08/christensen.pdf ("[Rising house prices allowed existing homeowners to increase their
debt levels dramatically.").
152 See id. at 37-38 (explaining that default rates group when housing prices reverse).
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channels. These include depressing household wealth and
consumption and constricting the real estate construction
market.153 Collapsing real estate prices can also create stickiness
in labor markets because borrowers may be unwilling or unable to
sell houses to move to where the jobs are located.154 These broader
economic effects feed into further problems for banks. The
prospect of rising defaults and losses can cause banks to suffer
runs, solvency crises, or a toxic combination of both.1
55
C. CYCLES IN BANK LEVERAGE
There are more complex interactions that may explain the
connection between bank crises. If positive serial correlation
means that real estate markets may be cyclical, then cutting edge
economic research indicates that financial institution leverage can
be cyclical too.
Economist John Geanakoplos has presented influential new
theories of a macroeconomic leverage cycle.156  Geanakoplos
observed that equilibrium in credit markets depends not only on
interest rates but also on the margin or collateral that lenders
demand for loans.157 The level of margin or collateral for a loan
153 See How Does the Slowdown in the Housing Market Affect the Construction Sector and
Other Housing-Dependent Industries, FED. RES. BANK S.F. (Jan. 2007), http://www.frbsf.org/e
ducation/publications/doctor-econ/2007/january/housing-business-cycles (explaining how
falling home prices makes building homes less profitable, which causes the construction
market to contract).
154 See generally Vincent Sterk, Home Equality, Mobility, and Macroeconomic Fluctuations,
74 J. MONETARY ECON. 16 (2015) (presenting a business cycle model that connects the decline
in prices in the housing market and the reduction of mobility, thus disrupting the labor
market).
155 See David C. Wheelock, What Happens to Banks When House Prices Fall? U.S.
Regional Housing Busts of the 1980s and 1990s, 88(5) FED. RES. BANK. ST. LOUIS REV. 413,
413 (2006), https:H/research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/O9Wheelock.pdf ("States
that experienced large declines in residential real estate prices tended to suffer more bank
distress, and longer and deeper declines in economic activity, than did other states.").
1 John Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle 1 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 1715,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1441943 (arguing that supply and demand
operate so as to determine loan leverage and the interest rate). See generally Ana Fostel &
John Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1211 (2008)
(introducing the concept of an "anxious economy," which is affected by leverage cycles).
157 Geanakoplos, supra note 156, at 1.
2015] BANK REGULATIONAND SECURITIZATION 121
dictates the leverage of the borrower, and Geanakoplos theorized
that leverage in the economy experiences cycles.158 During boom
times, lenders demand less collateral and leverage increases.159
Increased lending fuels the economy and drives margins lower and
leverage even higher. As a result, when the economy sours,
lenders demand more collateral.160 Reduced leverage and lending
throttles back the economy.
161
Geanakoplos's theoretical work has received empirical support
in the wake of the crisis, at least with respect to financial
institutions with large investment banking operations. Tobias
Adrian and Hyun Song Shin present evidence that financial
institution leverage has fluctuated in procyclical manner along
several dimensions. First, they find procyclical changes in the
leverage in the repo transactions by which large financial
conglomerates obtain short term funding.162 This aspect of their
work focuses on changes in collateral for loans, the same metric
that Geanakoplos examines.
However, they also look at a second way of measuring leverage:
the ratio of a firm's assets to its liabilities. Here, their data
indicates that investment banks (including bank holding
companies with large investment bank affiliates) dramatically
increased their leverage in the United States during boom years
and then dramatically decreased leverage after crises struck in
1987, 1998, and 2007.163 They also show that the repossession
market, which these financial institutions rely on for short-term
158 Id. at 2.
169 Id.; see also GERDING, supra note 87, at 383 n.113 ("Note that the value of non-cash
assets held as collateral may also increase during boom times. If the dollar value of
collateral stays the same, and assets posted as collateral rise in value, the lender may
withdraw assets from collateral and deploy them for other purposes.").
160 See Geanakoplos, supra note 156, at 2 ("[After the economic situation in 2009] leverage
has been drastically curtailed by nervous lenders wanting more collateral for every dollar.").
161 See id. ("De-leveraging is the main reason the prices of both securities and home prices
are still falling.").
162 TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No.
360, MONEY, LIQUIDITY, AND MONETARY POLICY 6 (2009), available at https://www.newyorkf
ed.org/medialibrary/mediaresearch/staffjreports/sr360.pdf.
163 Id. at 7 fig.8.
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financing, grew significantly in the boom years leading to the
Panic of 2008, peaked in March 2008, and then crashed.
164
Geanakoplos's model of a leverage cycle follows other
macroeconomic models of how credit more generally can generate
economic cycles. For example, in macroeconomics, the influential
Kiyotaki-Moore model illustrates a mechanism in which
collateralized lending can amplify exogenous shocks to the
economy.165 Similar to the Geanakoplos's analysis above, if these
shocks cause the value of collateral to drop, lenders can
dramatically curtail lending, slowing economic growth.
66
D. CYCLES COUPLED: PERFECT STORMS
If real estate and bank lending suffer from cyclical boom-bust
behavior, then real estate lending and bank investment can work
to couple these two cycles together. Bank lending fuels real estate
prices, and rising real estate prices drive up the value of bank
collateral and the level of bank returns.67  Increased bank
leverage not only makes banks more fragile, it can also increase
the effective supply of money, fuel asset price bubbles in real
estate (and other financial markets), and mask miscalculation of
risk by market participants and regulators.
68
This Article focuses on bank investments in real estate and the
cyclical nature of real estate and banking. A related and robust
literature, primarily in behavioral finance, has produced evidence
of herd behavior in stock markets.6 9 If bank investments in
164 Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation
and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 2 ANN. REV. ECON. 603, 606-07 (2010).
165 Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, Credit Cycles, 105 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1997).
166 Id. at 212.
167 See supra note 159 and accompanying text (noting how leverage lending and collateral
are interrelated).
168 GERDING, supra note 87, at 383-85.
169 Robert Shiller provided an early empirical and theoretical attack on the Efficient
Market Hypothesis and the contention that stock prices follow a "random walk." His work
argued that stock prices could be influenced by fads and social dynamics, which could result
in persistent mispricings or "bubbles." See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE
195-213 (3d ed. 2015) (critiquing the efficient market theory). See generally Robert J.
Shiller, Stock Prices and Social Dynamics, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 457
(proffering a theory that social dynamics have significant influence on financial behavior).
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mortgage-backed securities link real estate, bank lending, and
capital markets together, they also provide a means to link cycles
in all three of those markets. The danger, then, is that two or
more cycles start to spin together, like hurricanes joining in warm
water, to form a perfect storm. What potentially made this last
U.S. real estate crisis so much worse than the savings and loan
crisis of the 1980s was that fact that banks attached to financial
conglomerates were involved. The sprawling capital markets
activities of these institutions created yet another coupling rod,
this time joining real estate and banking crises with a broader
capital markets crisis.170
VI. CONCLUSION: POLICY APPROACHES AND POLITICS
Real estate investments by banks thus pose significant systemic
risk. Regulatory changes that enabled and encouraged bank
investments in mortgage-backed securities provided a new
transmission link between banking and real estate crises. This
Conclusion sketches out three potential policy approaches ranging
from blunt, sharply curtailed bank investments in real estate
related securities, to surgical, developing, counter-cyclical
regulations that curb bank risk exposures to real estate markets
when they begin to overheat. This Article ends by outlining the
thorny political dynamics that any of these approaches must
confront. The aim of this brief section is not to flesh out any single
policy approach or to do justice to the rich literature on reforming
Following and complementing Shiller, behavioral finance scholars developed both
theoretical models and empirical support for how "noise traders" or "investor sentiment" can
drive stock prices to patterns. See Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An
Experimental-Asset-Market Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV.
977, 994-1001 (summarizing behavioral finance literature on noise trading and bubbles);
see also Steven J. Cochran & Robert H. Defina, Duration Dependence in the U.S. Stock
Market Cycle: A Parametric Approach, 5 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 309, 315-16 (1995) (analyzing
predictability in U.S. stock markets from 1885 to 1992).
170 See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963
(2009) (analyzing ways in which capital markets, mortgage leading, and other activities,
combined under the roof of financial conglomerates, created conditions for subprime crisis).
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housing finance but rather to provide a rough map of the spectrum
of policy approaches and their tradeoffs.
A. CURBING BANK INVESTMENTS IN REAL ESTATE AND REAL ESTATE
SECURITIES MARKETS
The most radical and blunt approach to decoupling real estate
cycles from bank cycles and real estate crises from bank crises
would be to sharply limit banks' abilities to purchase or sponsor
mortgage-backed securities investments. This might be done
through sharp quantitative limitations on individual bank
portfolios or wholesale investment activity restrictions.
This approach faces severe limitations and has significant
downsides. To begin, sharply limiting bank investments in
mortgage-backed securities would remove liquidity from primary
and secondary mortgage markets, which could raise the cost of
mortgage borrowing.171 Even if these regulations would be
justified in terms of the benefits of reducing bank risk, their
political sustainability would be highly questionable. 172
Furthermore, limiting bank investments in mortgage-backed
securities could sharply limit the ability of banks to diversify their
portfolios. Arguments for diversification, however, must be taken
with several grains of salt. Witness the failure, or virtual failure,
of large financial conglomerates, such as Citigroup, in the global
financial crisis. The ability of financial institutions to invest in
different markets does not ensure that they will pursue an
appropriately balanced portfolio.173 Policymakers will find it hard
to reconcile the need for bank diversification with efforts to
dampen transmission lines for contagion between financial
171 See James T. Fergus & John L. Goodman, Jr., The 1989-92 Credit Crunch for Real
Estate: A Retrospective, 22 J. AM. REAL ESTATE & URB. ECON. ASS'N 5, 26 (noting the
liquidity benefits of mortgage-backed securities markets).
172 Banks, and related stakeholders, would be unlikely to entirely abandon the liquidity
benefits offered by secondary mortgage-backed securities markets. See id. (explaining how
mortgage-backed securities took liquidity and capital pressure off of banks).
173 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study In Managerial and Regulatory
Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 70 (2014) (noting that Citigroup's managers were overly
optimistic about Citigroups ability to "withstand the storms").
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markets. Diversification and contagion are Janus-faced aspects of
banking and banking regulation.
Diversification can also be seen from the opposite shore: even if
banks leave mortgage securitization altogether, some category of
financial institution would still have to invest in and sponsor
secondary mortgage transactions. If financial regulations
proscribe these institutions from engaging in depository banking
or other bank activities, then these institutions likely will have
excessive exposure to the real estate sector.
174
Limiting their purchases of mortgage-backed securities will
simply channel more of banks' capital to other asset classes, which
will be subject to risks and market flaws of their own. These other
assets may pose greater risks than mortgage-backed securities.
This raises not only the "which is the greatest evil" question, but,
more importantly, whether bank investments in any particular
asset class could be more effectively regulated short of a blunt ban
or quantitative restrictions.
B. REGULATING THE TYPES OF MORTGAGES IN WHICH BANKS CAN
INVEST
A more nuanced approach would be to regulate the credit
quality of the mortgage loans that banks can make or that serve as
inputs to the mortgage-backed securities banks are allowed to
purchase. This is largely the approach that U.S. financial reform
has taken post-crisis. It animates reforms and reform proposals
ranging from risk-retention ("skin in the game") rules,'75 the
Qualified Mortgage (QM) regulations (that impose an ability to
14 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae provide illustrations of what happens to financial
institutions that are limited to real estate-related investments; each residential real estate
downturn offers new threats to their solvency. W. SCOTT FRAME ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK
OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 719, THE RESCUE OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 1 (2015),
available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrarylmedia/researchlStaff-reports/sr719.pdf
("Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were destined to fail owing to their singular exposure to
residential real estate . .).
175 See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602, 77,617, 77,620, 77,655 n.173 (Dec. 24,
2014) (to be codified at scattered parts of 12, 17, and 24 C.F.R.) (referencing the usefulness
of ensuring sponsors have "skin in the game" to regulate risk in mortgage investments).
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repay rule and legal incentives for safer mortgage products),176 and
restrictions on mortgage loan-to-value or debt-to-income rules.
Each of these rules has faced sharp criticism.177
Risk-retention rules require mortgage originators to retain a
portion of the risk of mortgages sold into a securitization.78 These
rules aim to fix the dulled incentives that originators supposedly
have to check the creditworthiness of borrowers when their loans
will be offloaded.179 These skin in the game rules have several
significant drawbacks. First, they run counter to one of the
economic benefits of banks that make mortgage loans: the capacity
to take the credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk of those loans off
their balance sheets. Recall that securitization initially promised
to help financial institutions unload risk and solve asset-liability
mismatches.180 Second, skin in the game rules could constrain
banks' ability to redeploy cash for new loans because they retain
more risk, which means they need more liquidity to cover that
risk. This could cause concern that these rules will negatively
impact mortgage markets and borrowing costs for homeowners.
Mortgages that meet new QM standards are exempt from these
risk-retention rules.181 The QM standards presume that lenders
who make safer loans-which are known a "qualified mortgages"-
comply with the ability to repay rule. The final October 2014
federal regulations limit these qualified mortgages to ones with
the following criteria:
176 See 15 U.S.C. § 1369c(b)(2)(A) (2012) (defining "qualified mortgage"); Credit Risk
Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77,686-87 (explaining the agencies' decision to align the definition
of QRM with that of QMs as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1369c). See generally U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-185, MORTGAGE REFORMS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO HELP
ASSESS EFFECTS OF NEW REGULATIONS (2015), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-185
(discussing the steps necessary to implement the regulations regarding QMs and QRMS).
177 See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77,681-82 (explaining the agencies' rationale
for proposing loan-to-value requirements, which included criticism by commenters).
178 See id. at 77,655 (explaining how risk retention creates incentives to purchase quality
assets for securitization).
179 Id.
180 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (explaining how securitizations alleviate
banks' asset-liability mismatch problems).
181 Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77,686-87 (noting the exemptions required
under section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act for QRMs, which the agencies define
along the same criteria as QMs, thus effectively exempting both QMs and QRMs).
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(1) regular periodic payments of substantially
equal amount;
(2) no negative amortization, interest-only or
balloon payment features;
(3) a term of no more than 30 years;
(4) limitations on "points" and fees;
(5) reasonable efforts by the lender to consider,
document, and verify the borrower's ability to
repay the loan; and
(6) a cap on the debt-to-income ratio for the
borrower.
8 2
Risk retention rules faced criticism from two sides. Some
commentators denounced the rules as doing too little to ensure the
credit quality of mortgages.18 3  Others criticized the rules for
constraining access to mortgage credit, while arguing that less
restrictive alternatives would still be safe for financial markets.
8 4
This latter criticism demonstrates that efforts to restrict the
types of bank investments in mortgages and mortgage-related
securities will engender a heated political debate over access to
credit. Whether they use rules or standards, policymakers may
face constant pressure from banks and other financial
intermediaries to relax these rules. Their technical nature and the
lack of an organized interest group supporting their strenuous
application makes these rules politically fragile.
C. COUNTERCYCLICAL RULES
To address the risk of exposing banks to real estate cycles-and
to mitigate the danger of bank and real estate cycles feeding on
182 Id. at 77,690.
183 See Jeffery R. Favita, Note, The Exception That Ate the Rule: Why QRM Should Not
Equal QM, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 363, 390-91 (2014) (critiquing the risk retention rules'
use of the QM standard because QRM could be expanded with the definition of QM,
exposing them to more risk).
184 See Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage
Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe-From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L.
REv. 1539, 1568 n.107 (2015) (relaying the pushback from commenters on proposed QRM
definitions and exemptions, alleging they would restrict access to credit).
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one another-the most promising policy option is implementing
effective countercyclical regulations.8 5  Countercyclical bank
regulations work by tightening prudential requirements on banks
during boom times and loosening them after busts. This offers a
twofold benefit. First, these regulations ensure that banks enjoy a
greater safety buffer as markets begin to overheat and the dangers
of a crash increase.8 6 Second, countercyclical regulations can
operate to throttle-back bank lending or investments, which can
reduce the flow of credit fueling market booms.
8 7
The archetypal countercyclical regulation comes in loan loss
reserves, such as those implemented by Spain.88 Economists have
documented how traditional loan loss reserves that are based on
loan defaults in a prior period can exacerbate a market cycle.'8 9
When markets boom, fewer loans default, and regulations allow
banks to lower their reserves.190 Lower reserves allow banks to
extend more credit, which further fuels the market.191 This
feedback loop, however, lurches into painful reverse should asset
prices in a market plummet. Increased defaults can trigger higher
reserves, which curtails credit, which in turn causes asset prices to
plummet further and defaults to spike higher as homes are worth
less. The solution then is to use models of market cycles to
increase reserves during boom times and reduce them in busts.
192
Both Dodd-Frank and the Basel III proposals contain various
provisions to extend the countercyclical approach to capital
requirements. 193
185 See GERDING, supra note 87, at 491-95 (providing commentary on financial
countercyclicality); Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and its Challenges, ARIZ.
ST. L.J. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=256
8261 (identifying approaches to countercyclical financial regulation and their challenges).
186 GERDING, supra note 87, at 491.
187 Id. at 491-95.
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Countercyclical bank regulation will require fairly good, but not
perfect, models of economic cycles.194 They will require some
political will on the part of regulators not to undo countercyclical
rules that would otherwise remove the banking punch when the
real estate party gets started.195 Countercyclical approaches may
also be subject to regulatory arbitrage: when real estate markets
begin to heat up or demand for mortgage credit intensifies, the
incentives for banks to find workarounds for countercyclical
regulations will dramatically increase.
196
There is precedent for countercyclical regulations. Spain
instituted countercyclical loan loss reserve regulations (called
"dynamic provisioning") for its banks several years ago.'97 At first
blush, Spain's experience in the current crisis might appear to
weaken the argument for countercyclical regulations. The Spanish
rules, however, applied only to certain banks (bancos) and not to
cajas (called caixas in some regions), the savings banks at the
heart of the real estate bubble and bust in Spain.98 Economists
have argued that although countercyclical regulations were
flawed, they did spare Spain's larger banks from the brunt of the
financial crisis as experienced by financial institutions in other
European countries.199 Yet the Spanish example also warns of the
dangers of applying countercyclical rules to only certain categories
of financial institutions and the real possibility of regulatory
arbitrage since capital flows around legal restrictions.
194 Id. Patricia McCoy also analyzes the need for high quality data to be inputted into
these models. McCoy, supra note 185.
195 GERDING, supra note 87, at 491. This will be compromised to the extent regulators are
captured. McCoy, supra note 185.
196 GERDING, supra note 87, at 491; McCoy, supra note 185.
197 GERDING, supra note 87, at 492.
198 Id. (noting that dynamic provisions did not apply to cajas); Douglas J. Elliott, An
Overview of Macroprudential Policy and Countercyclical Capital Requirements 40 (Mar. 10,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.brookings.edul-/media/Files/rc/papers/2011103
1 1.capitaleliott/031 lcapitaleUiott.pdf.
199 Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, Financial Regulation Going Forward 11 (Inst. for
Monetary & Econ. Studies, Bank of Japan, Discussion Paper No. 2010-E-18, 2010), available
at http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/EnglishpublicationLconf/2010/Session5.pdf; Julio Ramos-Tallada,
Financial Distress and Banking Regulation: What is Different about Spain?, 6 J. INNOVATION
ECON. & MGMT. 49, 69-71 (2010), available at http://www.cairn.info/revue-journal-of-innovati
on-economics-2010-2-page-49.htm.
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This countercyclical idea could be extended to bank investments
in mortgage-backed securities. Banks that purchase mortgage-
backed securities should hold greater reserves or greater capital as
prices in real estate markets boom. This will require better
modeling of real estate cycles. As models imperfectly predict the
future, regulators must exercise some level of judgment to take
rules off autopilot. With greater judgment, however, comes
greater susceptibility to political pressure.
As a parting note, in each of the policy solutions listed above, it
is politics just as much as economics that poses the most daunting
challenge. Politics presents the final cycle from which the real
estate and bank lending cycles need to be decoupled. It is not only
the financial industry but also vast swaths of the public that
demand a robust supply of capital to residential real estate
markets. However, when this political demand feeds into and
feeds off of real estate and banking booms, the consequences can
be disastrous. Legal engineering spurred by politics helped join
together bank and real estate cycles. We must now rethink this
engineering to make its costs and consequences more explicit and
more controlled.
200
200 See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO.
L.J. 1177 (2012) (tracing the cause of the bubble to the oversupply of mortgage finance,
linking it to exploitation of information flaws in mortgage-backed securities); Adam J.
Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1111 (2013) (arguing that government participation in housing finance can be stabilizing
and productive, but policymakers did not see needed regulatory dimension in that
participation).
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